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Abstract 
This paper focuses on unique longitudinal research within a multi-vendor outsourcing 
environment in the European Defence Sector. It describes the unfolding relationship 
between vendors and a major defence organization as the vendors developed, 
implemented and then managed a human resource management (HRM) system. This 
paper examines the apparent paradox between the wide scale adoption of outsourcing 
and its relatively poor performance and outcomes.  The research suggests this comes 
from a loose coupling between the rational logic of outsourcing practice and the 
interpretation and enactment by interest groups that is exaggerated by the imposition of 
fixed deadlines and strong contractual governance.  
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Introduction to the outsourcing paradox 
Outsourcing is a co-operative inter-firm activity that involves the transfer of functions 
to external vendors, who manage the services for an agreed fee (Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998). Strategic Outsourcing extends this idea to include the subcontracting of part or 
all of an organisation’s internal systems to an external party that goes beyond just a 
‘simple service contract’ and takes the form of partnership or strategic alliance 
(Altinkemer et al., 1994). Although outsourcing in this form shares many of the 
characteristics of an alliance it differs in several fundamental aspects: it is a contracted 
time bound service controlled by service levels agreements, resources flow mainly from 
vendor to outsourcer and the outsource supplier delivers the service under the control 
and governance of the outsourcer. From this perspective outsourcing as an institutional 
change involves the implementation of new routines and processes and the takeover and 
management of activities which are time bound within the context of a stable existing 
operation. 
 Outsourcing is a prevalent practice and over 80% of organizations will outsource at 
least one service; despite this widespread adoption there are evident performance issues 
and increasing dissatisfaction (Alexander and Young, 1996) and an apparent dichotomy 
as to why outsourcing is so prevalent but lacks real empirical justification (Rouse, 
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2007). In this regard outsourcing as a change process shares very similar poor outcomes 
to other large scale changes, inter alia: Business Process Engineering (Holland and 
Kumar, 1995), Merger and Acquisitions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993), the chronic 
problems of ERP implementations (Scarbrough et al., 2008) and even major failings in 
large scale project implementations (Bronte-Stewart, 2009). This paper examines this 
paradox and suggests poor outsourcing outcomes are as a result of loose coupling 
between the rational logic of outsourcing implementation and interpretation and 
enactment by interest groups that is only exaggerated by the imposition of fixed 
deadlines and strong contractual governance often found in outsourcing agreements. 
This causes adaptation and compromise resulting in gaps between expectations and 
outcomes. 
 
 
Outsourcing as an institutional innovation 
In this paper we adopt an institutional lens to consider how organisational routines and 
mechanisms constrain and shape the outsourcing implementation process within an 
inter-firm context  to maintain stability and control (Zucker, 1987). Institutional theory 
focuses on the ‘deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure’ and is based on the 
idea that organisations consist of regular patterns and routines across social contexts and 
have organising principles or logics that operate within organizational fields that act to 
mediate actor action (Scott, 2004). Institutions are ‘material practices or symbolic 
constructions’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248).  The underlying assumption 
underpinning institute   onal theory is that organisations are deeply embedded in social 
and cultural practice and organizational structure and practices are ‘strongly influenced 
by institutional demands’ (Weiss et al., 2013: 3). 
Outsourcing as a practice is predicated on the notion of standardization. Suppliers are 
contracted to provide a service and benefits such as cost reduction derived from the 
ability to implement standard processes grounded in their core competences across a 
wide client base. The basis of outsourcing therefore is the ability of vendors to pool the 
demand from their client organisations and to deliver standardised services. This idea is 
extended when considering ERP or other commercial off the shelf (COTS) software 
packages. However, implementation occurs between organisations that consist of 
diverse competing interests, coalitions of interest groups, who have potentially diverse 
goals and objectives for the activity. What is implied by this is that these diverse groups 
can expropriate and ‘bend’ major change programmes, such as outsourcing 
programmes, to suit their particular group needs (Berente and Yoo, 2012). Furthermore, 
complex inter-firm institutions can span several logics, such as the supplier and buyer 
perspective or even between departments within the same organization, and as a result 
have distinct organizational logics which may be responsive and adaptive to each other 
and can remain largely distinct. 
According to Institutional Theory two processes are important during the 
implementation of a major organizational change, firstly - deinstitutionalisation or the 
erosion of existing institutional norms that occurs in parallel with the implementation of 
a change such as outsourcing (Seal, 2003) and secondly, institutionalisation whereby 
systems and procedures becomes the accepted norm and become integrated into 
organizational life (Currie, 2009). In order for effective change to occur old processes 
and systems must be replaced by the new, and the current ‘taken for granted’ ways of 
working and behaviours maintained by the isomorphic pressures of coercion, mimetic 
and normative systemic power need to be broken down and replaced. This work of 
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institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation is carried out by actors who exercise 
episodic power to ‘create, transform, maintain and disrupt institutions’ (Lawrence, 
2008: 173). Institutionalisation of change in complex technology or organizational 
contexts thus takes place in parallel to the process of deinstitutionalisation. From this 
standpoint bureaucratic stable organizations can inhibit change during system 
development (Currie, 2009) creating project inertia from the tension that arises between 
the ‘acceptance’ of the changes from the new system and a ‘replication logic’ seeking to 
maintain the status quo (D’Adderio, 2014). Furthermore, actors resist institutional 
control and agency by acts of mobilisation and the exercise of influence that imposes 
limits on the agency and control of institutions. These resulting acts of resistance range 
from passive acquiescence, compromise, defying or ignoring the change to 
manipulation and subversion that adapts the relationship between the actors and the 
institution (Lawrence, 2008).  
Institutional control regulates the activities within desired principles and goals 
(Janowitz, 1975) whereas institutional agency is the work of actors to modify and 
change institutional practices (DiMaggio, 1988). Within this context resistance reduces 
or modifies the impact of both institutional agency and control. These three forms of 
power (control, agency and resistance) in in the view of Lawrence (2008) form the basis 
of institutional politics and impact on all elements of the project during all phases: the 
scope of the delivery, the use of standards, delivery approaches, project control and 
techniques, the design of functional and non-functional requirements and the delivery 
and quality control of service. From this discussion the ‘interplay’ between these three 
aspects of power (represented in figure 1) within the organizational field can be 
described as the ‘institutional politics of a situation’ and is used as the guiding 
framework within this research (ibid). 
 
 
Institutions
Actors
Episodic Power
Influence
Force 
Systemic Power
Discipline
Domination
Institutional Resistance
Work of Actors to resist control and agency
Institutional Agency
Work of Actors to 
create maintain or 
transform institutions
Institutional Control
Impact of institutions 
on the beliefs and 
behaviours of actors
 
Figure 1- Lawrence, (2008) Institutional Politics and the Three Aspects of Power  
 
There is a large body of research within the field of institutional theory which considers 
institutional effects and far fewer that adopt a process oriented approach (Currie, 2009). 
This paper responds to the call for more process-oriented organization research that 
expands the agenda to not only consider stability but explicitly study the process of 
institutional change (Currie and Swanson, 2009).  
 
From the above discussion our research question is: What is the role of control, agency 
and resistance in the adoption of outsourcing within organizations? 
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Research design and data collection 
The research reported in this paper is a longitudinal, action research case study 
(Gummerson, 1991, Yin, 1994) using participant observation (Waddington, 2004), 
interviews and documentary analysis of contracts and substantial volumes of ongoing e-
mail traffic (Rowlinson, 2004, May, 2005) focusing on the negotiation, initialization, 
implementation and service activities between four collaborative partners in the defence 
industry as they implemented a large-scale human resource application (HRMSys) for a 
defence client (DefCo). The IT requirements were contracted to a major IT systems 
house which outsourced complex IT requirements to a relatively small specialist 
software house in the UK, and the testing and validation of the software to a company 
(TestCo) in Romania.  
The case was monitored for five years from contract bid and award in 2008 until 
September 2013 when the initial operating capability (IOC) delivery was accepted. 
Research data for the implementation phase included: semi-structured and structured 
interviews, documented workshops, research diaries, all contract documentation, design, 
planning, project management and control documents, internal memos and all 
monitoring reports. This data was stored electronically in archive folders covering the 
general project control (13 folders, 535 files), design (12 folders, 675 files), emails 
(4,921) and memos/reports (1389). All data, including extracted emails, was entered to 
a password protected database, nvivo10. 
Analysis was based on identifying the themes of control, agency and resistance 
observed at identified critical moments during project implementation using the 
theoretical lens of power in institutions (Lawrence, 2008).  We first focus on antecedent 
conditions and history of the two main protagonists, HRMDept and Personsoft, showing 
how their process of interaction led to an institutional logic that favoured informality 
and ad hoc delivery over professional project practices before going on to consider what 
changed this over the course of the project to a much more professional, management 
logic, as the organisation was forced to comply with these new norms (Oliver, 1992). 
The research took a process perspective and examined specific events where periods of 
activity or ‘patterns of interaction may change as a result of specific encounters’ (Robey 
and Newman, 1996: 250). The model is based on punctuated equilibrium, where quasi 
stable periods are adapted by specific incidents that may disrupt or transform the 
prevailing patterns of activities and give rise to patterns of power or resistance (van de 
ven and Poole, 1990). To understand the processes of institutionalization that occurred 
during implementation phase of five years it is important to first assess the antecedents 
to the project. Following this overview we will then go on to present key incidents and 
consider how institutional processes impacting at these points in time influenced the 
outcomes and contributed to project failure. 
 
Findings 
 
Antecedents to the HRMSys project 
Personsoft, the provider of the software package, first started working with the human 
resource department of the organization (HRMDept) in late 1998 when version 3 of the 
human resource management system that would later form the core of the HRMSys 
application was first implemented. At that time formal IT support for the core mission 
of HRMDept was limited and no formal system was in the pipeline. The director of the 
organisation determined more substantial support was needed for its establishment 
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planning for both peacetime and crisis establishments, particularly as the processes 
across the organisation were diverse and uncontrolled. The major driver for the 
implementation was therefore to ensure coherent and consistent control over the 
management of postings and establishment for both military and civilian personnel 
across Europe. Conceptually this ‘ideal’ institutional logic shown by the HRM 
Department can be characterised as ‘managerial’ drawing on a ‘business as defence’ 
rationale and leads to practices such as the control and coordination of information 
across entities within the wider organization as its prime mission and purpose. 
From the time of the initial implementation the relationship between Personsoft (a 
small company of around fifty people) and HRMDept can be characterised as highly 
cooperative with Personsoft responding rapidly and flexibly to requirements and the 
Department for its part tolerating the lack of formal techniques, such as testing and 
documentation. Furthermore, contracting for services was informal and the director of 
HRMDept acquired funding from various ‘budget pots’ without recourse to a formal 
bidding process. Personsoft at this stage offered services on a ‘time and materials basis’ 
determined by the amount of money available from the Department at that moment in 
time. The development process during this early period was highly interactive and 
developmental between the two organisations and the engagement process ad hoc and 
entrepreneurial. The institutional logic at this time was more characteristic of ‘personal 
capitalism’ and practiced with the consultant as technician, resolving issues 
pragmatically within a governance structure of the entrepreneurial tradesmen (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008). 
This situation changed during 2006 when the HRMDept promoted the acquisition of 
a commercial off-the-shelf package (COTS) to replace the incumbent application to 
expand both the scope and usage of the application as well as to formally embed the 
processes and IT support it had developed within the organisation. As a consequence of 
the long-standing relationship and the desire to maintain tight control over the 
acquisition process HRMDept encouraged Personsoft to bid for this contract. 
 
“I suspected that the procurement process would have devolved naturally to one 
of the big ERP HR type of provider. The fact that we were incumbent, the fact that 
John was there, the fact that he had tailored to some extent the requirements to 
more explicitly follow the capability that they had already installed …certainly 
shifted the goalposts towards us.”[Sales Manager Personsoft] 
 
However the approach to go for a COTS solution had a profound implication for the 
incumbent provider. 
 
“…we were trying to sell a COTS product in a situation where the history had 
been essentially bespoke development.” [Service Director Personsoft] 
 
This move towards a more formal structure, specified requirements and tight contracts 
can be interpreted as a change in the institutional logics within the organizational field 
from an ‘ad-hoc’ informal process to one more characteristic of ‘professional project 
management’ with a focus on tracking and delivery, compliance to standards and 
contract management. 
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The formalization of HRMSys Project 
The project was split over four project phases at a high level conforming to the 
following activities: requirements and their validation, design with demonstration of 
compliance to non-functional and organizational standards, development and the 
creation of bug free software and finally controlled implementation onto the 
organisation’s infrastructure. Figure 2 illustrates the implementation phase of HRMSys 
and shows the project phases delivered mainly by Personsoft, and the ongoing 
management of the incumbent system by HRMDept the principal user group in the 
project. The figure also illustrates some of the sources of influence in the design and 
development of the new application HRMSys, especially the role of the incumbent, 
which was used as a reference system for much of the functional requirements.  
High level incidents over the four phases were selected based on their salience and 
analysed in terms of power aspects demonstrated during the encounter. The breakdown 
into incidents and observation of power over the project main phases is shown in table 
1.  
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Figure 2 – The actors’ interaction during HRMSys: Author 
 
Here the analysis from the requirements validation phase will be extracted to illustrate 
the link from the raw data to the analysis and thus demonstrate how the interactions 
reveal the nature of institutional politics. 
 
Defining and Controlling Requirements 
During the requirements phase (encounters 1, 2, 3 in table 1) the main work of the 
actors was to shape and modify the system requirements. At start-up the contractual 
terms and project timescales were re-emphasised by Agency, the contract owner, to the 
extent that interventions during the meeting emphasised compliance and the bounds on 
the suppliers and the potential sanctions should these be exceeded. This was particularly 
evident in the observation of the Contract Manager Agency: 
 
 “…we have had cause to ask for liquidated damages in the past for projects that 
have exceeded the contract milestones” [Contract Manager Agency].  
 
Furthermore, the project elapsed time from bid submission to project start-up was in 
excess of three years and from supplier perspective there was a substantial risk of 
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requirement obsolescence and change. However during a supplier presentation covering 
the requirements validation process this was restated as ‘not validation but 
verification’[Contract Manager Agency] going on to suggest that new requirements 
recently introduced were expected to be ‘already substantially covered’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept] in the application and no change in project scope was expected. 
There are several illustrations of power shown by this short exchange, firstly, in 
terms of the boundaries of behaviour and locus of control, secondly, the restating of the 
expected power relationship between buyer and supplier. There is also a thinly veiled 
threat of the use of force to ensure compliance to the buyer’s authority. It worked and 
the threat of ‘liquidated damages’ was reproduced by project actors at every juncture 
when a chance of overrun occurred. Furthermore, the introduction of new requirements 
and how they could be offset against existing functionality in the incumbent application 
was to trigger a heated negotiation.  Buyers insisting these could be included within the 
existing contractual scope at no additional cost whilst suppliers countering the new 
requirements were ‘not included in the bid submission’ and must be paid for. This 
illustrates both institutional agency and resistance to these changes, especially from the 
suppliers attempting inter alia, to broker extended time for validation to show the 
impact on the cost and schedule and therefore justify increased costs.  
Requirements validation (encounter 2) was a process nominally planned for two 
weeks in the first phase of the project. The main focus turned out to be an intense 
negotiation about how to include the new requirements introduced at the start of the 
implementation without extending the scope of the project in time or finance. The 
meeting was held at the supplier location and consisted of the 15 main project actors. 
Validation of the accepted bid requirements was not actually discussed and these issues 
pushed out to the design process phase later in the project.  
There were two main processes going on during this negotiation. Firstly, the buyer 
introduced new requirements that were to be offset against obsoleted or already 
delivered functions. The process involved buyers repeatedly posing that the ‘substantive 
functionality was already present’ [HRMDept Director] in the incumbent application or 
could be ‘reasonably assumed’ [Independent test and validation consultant] to be 
delivered from the existing requirements matrix meaning the development time saved 
by using the incumbent application as a baseline could be offset against the new 
requirements at no extra cost. Furthermore, obsoleted and no longer needed 
requirements, further acted in the buyers view to reduce any potential project impact. 
 
“According to our interpretation, these changes should be cost neutral so no 
authorization for extra funding will be necessary, and thus (also) precluding a 
significant impact (on the project schedule).” [Contract Manager Agency] 
 
 Against this suppliers proposed that the new requirement substantially altered 
project scope and had a fundamental impact on the timescales and delivery and used this 
position to counter the buyer’s argument and to negotiate substantial relief on 
‘awkward’, difficult to deliver functionality, within the current platform. 
The overall process during the requirements phase and later stages revolved around 
this type of formal and informal negotiation and brokering, including the bypassing of 
the formal project meetings, to reduce or maintain scope, and these are processes of 
institutional agency and resistance. Institutional constraint via rules, processes and 
established norms of practice regulated the work of the actors in the HRMSys project 
and actors’ agency modified and shaped the practice of outsourcing to suit sectional 
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interest. Furthermore, actors resisted the application of power and influence posing 
alternatives, negotiating compromises, demonstrating that the outcomes of this project 
were enacted in practice. 
 
The causes of project failure 
The HRMSys only delivered an upgrade to the existing incumbent application along 
with a limited set of new requirements. Implementation scheduled for 10 months 
actually took 17 months and cost overruns for the suppliers were close to 100%. The 
root cause for this failure was a fundamental mismatch between the institutional logic of 
Personsoft that emphasised informality and collaboration in development compared 
with that required for this project which emphasised compliance and control more 
characteristic of a professional service company. This mismatch was seen throughout 
the project trajectory in terms of lack of documentation, continuous rework and poor 
coordination across suppliers. 
Two main processes can be seen during the change that the software provider 
underwent throughout the project as it moved from an ad-hoc artisan to conform more 
to a professional services ideal. Firstly a ‘replication logic’ whereby the organization 
attempted to reproduce the old ways of working and relationships that would de-
emphasise formality and rigour, and secondly incorporating the practice and processes 
coherent and compliant to the new situation. An ‘institutional logic’ that now favoured 
standardisation and compliance however constrained the entire project to move at the 
speed of adaptation of a core actor and reinforced inertia and prevented the project 
adapting to changing circumstances and requirements. Mechanism such as design rules, 
audits and acceptance testing characteristic of a formal managerialist ‘project 
management logic’ was at variance with the prevailing practice between the main 
protagonists prior to the project and forced the software supplier to undergo a 
fundamental change process. It is this mismatch between the prevailing and demanded 
underlying logics and the slow process of adoption to compliant practices that led to the 
relative failure of this supplier to deliver the software. 
 
Conclusion and implications for practice 
The value of an institutional lens and a power perspective is that it moves the research 
agenda away from an overly rationalist view of how outsourcing proceeds as a 
management practice. Strong controls and tight contracts focused on ‘safeguarding’ or 
‘prevention’ increases the control over suppliers but reduces the opportunity for 
cooperation in outsourcing engagements (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011, Poppo 
and Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, processes put in place to constrain and regulate 
supplier’s behaviour to reduce risk, minimise supplier opportunism and ensure success 
are founded on a purely rational deterministic perspective. This notion of technological 
determinism implicit in current outsourcing practice ignores the effects of institutional 
and actor agency and the resistance actors can mobilise to modify implementation 
processes to suit their own sectional interests. From this perspective we argue that 
outsourcing can be seen as a socially constructed and enacted process with parties able 
‘to escape’ and resist contractual straightjackets leading to a patterns of power and 
conflict during implementation that unfolds as different parties interact and negotiate. 
From this standpoint outsourcing outcomes are processes of negotiation emergent over 
time the outcome of which depends on countervailing institutional pressures of stability 
and change - and the role of people and power within this is key. 
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Table 1- Analysis of Power Dimensions Observed During Project 
Event Location of the event in project: description Main Interaction state Power Dimensions Observed Resistance Observed 
En1 
 
 
Requirements: Project start-up off meeting at Brussels and introduction of the 
scope change. 
Discipline: Entry emphasised 
contractual commitments implied use 
of dominance threat of sanctions. 
Dominance hierarchy strongly 
emphasised verification not validation 
stated. Maintenance of  ambiguity 
Focus on validation and lack of clarity 
implied in requirement and passage of 
time causing change from bid. 
En2 
 
 
Requirements: System requirements refinement and adaptation of scope   with 
offset against existing delivered functions and the obsoleted requirements. 
Agency: Buyers maintaining while 
suppliers seeking to extend scope 
changing the rules of engagement. 
Influence especially around trading of 
requirements and recourse to previous 
relations 
Brokering agreement by bypassing 
formal communication of project 
directly between users and Personsoft.  
En3 
 
 
Requirements: Contract amendment with list of requirements and impact 
statement stating new scope and timelines  
Agency: Re-shaping the phases and 
content delivered putting off of 
difficult to out of scope of project. 
Negotiation and shaping asking for 
more setting for less to maintain 
overall scope – some surveillance. 
Feasibility of plan doubted by suppliers 
scope of documentation reduced – 
brokered changes not COTS. 
En4 
 
Design: Workshops and refinement of the technical design. Number and type of 
Use Cases, scope of documentation, restrictions in requirements and design 
rules agreed.  
Discipline: Project management and 
professional service company rules of 
engagement emphasised 
Emphasis on norms of documentation 
and design rules –boundary of 
acceptability defined. 
Compromise and avoidance as supplier 
sought to reduce the burden of work – 
lack of formality was exposed.  
En5 
 
Design: Workshops directly between users and development allowed, creation 
process maps, flow diagrams, Use Cases and walkthroughs and story boards of 
concept functional delivery. 
Agency: reshaping some limitations in 
access to user resources such as 
subject matter experts. 
Influence and brokering rules – 
discipline expressed in denial of direct 
access between users and Personsoft. 
Bypassing of formal structure and 
brokering agreement on approach -
appeals to the past. 
En6 
 
 
Configuration: Software development of  COTS package to cover new 
requirements -  multiple releases due to poor software and ongoing changing 
requirements added to internal test and acceptance burden 
Discipline: self-identification of 
deficiencies and strict control on 
releases to Buyer. 
Enforcement of testing and formal 
project management processes to 
control software delivery. 
Acquiescence following several failures 
and rejections. 
En7 
 
Configuration: Testing of release PMSys on FAT, Reference System (SAT) and 
initial UAT to check for user configuration compatibility – interrupted by failure 
re-run broadly successful.  
Force: Plan demanded by Agency 
following test failure and breakdown of 
implementation process. 
Strict surveillance on actor’s re-
emphasis on formal project control. 
Acquiescence with some compromises 
to share work and minimise impact of 
failures. 
En8 
 
 
Configuration: Notice of delay from Agency invocation of liquidated damages 
due to design delays and FAT failure. 
Force: Visible expression by Agency of 
authority. 
Restatement of authority and 
dominance within institution hierarchy. 
Denial of culpability between actors – 
temporary breakdown in project and 
exchanges of blame. 
En9 
 
Configuration: Rework application and correction of vital and critical security 
deficiencies from core application. Update of all documentation and creation of 
new baseline demanded.  
Discipline: Weekly/daily on-line update 
and progress meetings and interaction 
emphasised control and enclosure. 
Enforcement of testing and formal 
project management emphasised – 
surveillance and discipline. 
Brokering acceptance, agenda setting 
and bypassing formal structure to 
wield influence. 
En10 
 
Implementation: UAT and acceptance testing including a re-run of security 
integration test and validation routines (IT&V) – new security failures. UAT test 
included a full regression over all the COTS core application. 
Agency:  Negotiating and brokering the 
test – support from Personsoft held at 
arm’s length initially.  
Influence by brokering and recourse to 
history between protagonists – some 
use of force to exclude. 
Brokering changes in process to allow 
access and control of users. Some 
selflessness in free support. 
En11 
 
Implementation: Notification of UAT failure from full regression test at PCR 15 Force: UAT test revealed large errors in 
core COTS package going back years 
rejected by users. 
‘Settling of old scores’ showed use of 
force against Personsoft 
Denial of problems protests against 
approach adopted. Bypassing and 
appeals to authority. 
En12 
 
Implementation: Rework application and correction of vital and critical security 
deficiencies – update all documentation and preparation new baseline 
demanded.  
Discipline: Bi-weekly update meetings 
and careful control of deliverables 
within required norms 
Emphasis on compliance to project 
management professional norms – 
project hierarchy enacted.  
Acquiescence with some compromises 
sought on criticality levels of security 
failures. 
En13 
 
Implementation: Installation and testing, new security errors and minor 
documentation changes. Two running patches allowed 7.1/7.2 – UAT testing 
supported to trap more user deficiencies. 
Discipline: Actors operating within 
bounds of practice and project norms. 
Emphasis on control and disciplined 
action with aspects of ‘give and take’ 
during negotiated exchanges. 
Acquiescence with some aspects of 
compromise as supplier and users 
jointly reviewed software. 
En14 
 
 
Implementation: UAT acceptance and installation production environment with 
contractual agreement contents for patch rolling up all minor and significant 
deficiencies into two maintenance releases MR1 and MR2 post go-live. 
Agency: Installation was supported by 
all parties - negotiations and shaping 
acceptance. 
Influence and persuasion to gain 
acceptance – negotiation and 
brokering between actors. 
Compromises with some avoidance 
activities to reduce impact of follow on 
changes – some trading. 
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